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SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS FOR
THE SALE OF STOCK IN WEST
VIRGINIA
In Hoge v. Pollard' the West Virginia court was again called
upon to decide whether equity would grant specific performance of
a contract to transfer" corporate stock. Since the question ap-
pears to have arisen infrequently in this jurisdiction, the cases
cited,' taken together, may be said to encompass the essential fea-
tures of West Virginia law on the subject.
The general rule in West Virginia" as well as in other Amer-
ican jurisdictions5 is that equity will not ordinarily grant specific
performance of contracts for the sale of corporate stock. The rea-
son advanced in support of this rule is that the mode of dealing in
stock in this country is such that most stocks have a readily ascer-
tainable monetary value and are easily available on the open mar-
ket.6 Therefore, damages at law afford a complete and adequate
remedy. However, shares of stock, being unlike most other per-
sonalty in that they are intangible and frequently have an
extrinsic value, are often both difficult to purchase and to evaluate.
It is in these instances that exceptions to the above stated general
rule arise.
The reasons set forth in the leading case of Hogg v. McGuffin'
serve to indicate on what grounds the West Virginia court will
grant specific performance of contracts for stock. In that ease the
defendant agreed to exchange stock in the A company for shares
in the B company held by plaintiff. The court, while recognizing
the general rule, said that specific performance of this contract
1 188 S. B. 867 (W. Va. 1936).
2 Although the suit was to compel the transfer of stock, the court relied on
cases involving purchase and sale, pointing out that so far as the jurisdiction
of equity is concerned it is immaterial whether the question arises in the pur-
chase and sale of stock or otherwise.
3 188 S. B. 867, 869 (NV. Va. 1936).
4 Gibbon v. Jameson's Ex'rs, 5 Call 294 (Va. 1804) ; Burke v. Parke, 5 W.
Va. 122, 126 (1872); Bumgardner v. Leavitt, 35 NV. Va. 194, 13 S. E. 67, 12
L. R. A. 776 (1891) ; Hissam v. Parish, 41 IV. Va. 686, 24 S. U. 600, 56 Am.
St. Rep. 892 (1896); Hogg v. McGufiln, 67 W Va. 456, 68 S. B. 41 (1910),
31 L. R. A. (N. s.) 491 (1911); Morgan v. Bartlett, 75 W. Va. 293, 83 S. B.
1001, L. R. A. 1915D 300 (1914); Hubbard v. George, 81 W. Va. 538, 94 S. E.
974, L. R. A. 1918C 835 (1918); McCullough v. Clark, 81 W. Va. 743, 95 S. E.
787 (1918).
S POMEROY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1926) § 19.
aId. at § 18.
7 Id. at § 19; 2 CooK, CORPORAT ONs (8th ed. 1923) § 338.
8 Hogg v. McGuffin, 67 W. Va. 456, 68 S. E. 41 (1910).
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should be granted because (1) the amount of plaintiff's damages
could not be accurately estimated because the B company stock was
a factor to consider and the B company was insolvent; (2) the A
company stock was not on the stock list and had no stock list value;
(3) the stock sued for had a peculiar value to plaintiff since he
desired it for a special and legitimate personal purpose - i. e., its
present and promising prospective value; (4) the A company was
a "close corporation" and its stock was not available on the open
market; (5) defendant was insolvent; (6) the stock had a peculiar
value by reason of its intangible nature.
Of the bases for equitable relief above enumerated, those most
frequently relied on in the West Virginia cases are: the uncer-
tainty in the value of the stock by reason of its not being on the
stock list," unavailability of the stock because closely held," and
its peculiar value to the party seeking specific performance."," De-
cisions from other jurisdictions12 would indicate that the uncer-
tainty in the value of the stock which will be recognized as a suf-
ficient ground for equitable interference must arise, not merely
from the fact that the stock is not on the stock list, but from the
fact that the true value of the stock cannot be ascertained from
any available circumstances. In the case of Hubbard v. George,'
the West Virginia court granted specific performance when the
evidence showed that on an inquiry among persons reputedly con-
versant with the value of the stock, those persons varied widely in
their estimates of that value. It has also been held that the fact
that the price of a-particular stock was dependent on the divergent
judgments of a number of individual holders, and that it had no
market value, rendered its value so uncertain that an award of
money damages would not b6 an adequate remedy.' 4 Thus, at least
9Hogg v. McGuffin; Morgan v. Bartlett; Hubbard v. George; McCullough
v. Clark, all supra n. 4; Wallace v. Eclipse Pocahontas Coal Co., 83 W. Va. 321,
98 S. E. 293 (1919).
2o Bumgardner v. Leavitt; Hogg v. McGuffin; Morgan v. Bartlett; McCul-
lough v. Clark, all supra n. 4; Wallace v. Eclipse Pocahontas Coal Co., 83 W.
Va. 321, 98 S. E. 293 (1919).
1 Bumngardner v. Leavitt; Hogg v. MeGuffin, both supra n. 4; Lathrop v.
Columbia Collieries Co., 70 W. Va. 58, 73 S. E. 299 (1912) ; Hubbard v. George,
81 W. Va. 538, 94 S. E. 974 (1918) ; Applegate v. Wellsburg Banking & Trust
Co., 68 W. Va. 477, 69 S. E. 901 (1918); Wallace v. Eclipse Pocahontas Coal
Co., 83 W. Va. 321, 98 S. E. 293 (1919).
12 Butler v. Wright, 103 App. Div. 463, 93 N. Y. S. 113 (1905) ; Clements v.
Sherwood-Dunn, 108 App. Div. 327, 95 N. Y. S. 766 (1905) ; Moulton v. 'War-
Ten Mfg. Co., 81 Minn. 259, 83 N. W. 1082 (1900); Ryan v. McLane, 91 Md.
175, 46 Atl. 340, 50 L. R. A. 501 (1900).
13 Hubbard v. George, 81 W. Va. 538, 94 S. E. 974, L. R. A. 1918C 835
(1918).
'4 Morgan v. Bartlett, 75 W. Va. 293, 83 S. E. 1001 (1914).
2
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by implication, the West Virginia court has indicated that it adopts
the rational general rule that the mere fact that the stock does not
appear on the stock list is not a sufficient basis for granting spe-
cific performance. Another basis for specific performance which
is mentioned in a large number of cases is the unavailability of the
stock. From the very nature of things, this question would
generally arise only when the stock of the corporation is closely
held - it would rarely be a factor where the stock sued for is listed
on the market. The third element much 'relied on by the courts
is that of the peculiar value of the stock. By peculiar value here
is meant something more than "uniqueness" as generally applied
to personalty. The peculiar value of the stock may not necessarily
arise from anything inherent in the stock itself, but ratherfrom
the peculiar situation of the party seeking to acquire the stock.
This point is illustrated in the case of Bumgardner v. Leavitt' in
which the court said that the peculiar value of the shares sued for
rested in the fact that the acquisition thereof would give plaintiff
control of the company. This is apparently the law in West Vir-
ginia,"6 although other authorities are not uniform' 7 in their hold-
ings as to whether or not a desire for control is a sufficient reason
for granting specific performance. One other reason advanced ill
the Hogg case'8 for the awarding of equitable relief is that the de-
fendant was insolvent and that therefore plaintiff should not be
confined to a recovery of damages at law. Apparently the West
Virginia court later took a different view of this matter, for in the
case of Warren Company v. Black Coat Company5 it said that
if a contract will not otherwise be specifically enforced, the mere
insolvency of the defendant will not be a basis for equitable relief.
As is illustrated by the Hogg case,2 the court appears to be
reluctant to base its result on any single one of the reasons above
mentioned. Hence, the cases usually contain two or more of the
bases which have been pointed out. V. V. 0.
'2 Bumgardner v. Leavitt, 35 W. Va. 195, 13 S. E. 67, 12 L. R. A. 776 (1891).
-e Hubbard v. George, contains a dictum (at 541) in accord with what is said
on this point in Bumgardner v. Leavitt, both supra n. 4.
1 Rimes v. Rimes, 152 Ga. 721, 111 S. E. 34 (1922), 22 A. L. R. 3030 (1923)
(specific performance refused where plaintiff's purpose was to secure control
of the corporation) ; Ryan v. McLane, 91 'Md. 175, 46 At]. 340 (1900) (specific
performance refused where control sought by plaintiff would harm minority
stockholders). Sherman v. Herr, 220 Pa. 420, 69 AtI. 899 (1908); Schmidt
v. Pritchard, 135 La. 240, 112 N. W. 801 (1907) (specific performance granted
where purpose of plaintiff was to secure control of the corporation).
3 8Hogg v. McGuffin, 67 W. Va. 456, 68 S. E. 41 (1910).
19 Warren Co. v. Black Coal Co., 85 W. Va. 684, 102 S. E. 672 (1920).
20 Hogg v. McGuffin, 67 V. Va. 456, 68 S. R. 41 (1910).
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